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SCHOOLS—HANDICAPPED CHILDREN: 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RULES 
THAT THE 1997 AMENDMENTS TO INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT DO NOT CATEGORICALLY 
BAR TUITION REIMBURSEMENT FOR UNILATERAL 
PRIVATE-SCHOOL PLACEMENTS 
Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009) 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., the United States Supreme 
Court held the 1997 Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act (IDEA) do not mandate that a child must have received special 
education or related services under the authority of a public agency to be 
eligible to receive tuition reimbursement for a placement in private school.  
Allowing school districts to avoid reimbursing parents for the cost of their 
child’s private special education by claiming the child never received spe-
cial education in public school would create a perverse incentive for school 
districts not to identify children as eligible for special education or related 
services.  In so holding, the Court concluded IDEA continues to authorize 
reimbursement for the costs of special education and related services when 
school districts fail to provide a free, appropriate public education, and 
where placement in private school is appropriate under IDEA.  Although no 
categorical bar exists to reimbursement when a child has not previously 
received special education in public school, tuition reimbursement remains 
an equitable remedy to be granted by courts in some, but not all, circum-
stances.  After Forest Grove, courts remain free to grant or deny reimburse-
ment based on equitable considerations, such as whether the party seeking 
reimbursement provided to the school district sufficient notice of its intent 
to place the child in private school.  Forest Grove removed the categorical 
bar to tuition reimbursement some circuit courts of appeals had read into 
the 1997 Amendments, and made clear that tuition reimbursement is an 
available remedy to be granted when warranted by the equities. 
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I. FACTS 
T.A. was born on September 11, 1985.1  Beginning in kindergarten, he 
attended public school in the Forest Grove School District of Forest Grove, 
Oregon (School District).2  Throughout his elementary school years, T.A.’s 
teachers noticed he had difficulty paying attention in class and completing 
his schoolwork.3  With extensive help from his parents and sister, however, 
T.A. managed to pass from grade to grade.4 
T.A.’s difficulties became increasingly evident while he attended 
Forest Grove High School (FGHS).5  In December 2000, while T.A. was a 
freshman at FGHS, T.A.’s mother contacted his school counselor to discuss 
T.A.’s problems with his schoolwork.6  The school counselor suspected 
T.A. might have a learning disability and referred him for an evaluation to 
determine whether he qualified for special education services under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 
(IDEA or the Act).7  The School District provided notice to T.A.’s mother 
 
1. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008). 
2. Id. 
3. Brief of Respondent at 7, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009) (No. 08-
305). 
4. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1081.  For example, by the time T.A. entered high school in 
September 2000, his mother was working with him on his schoolwork at least two hours per day.  
Brief of Respondent, supra note 3, at 7.  In November 2001, with his mother still helping him with 
schoolwork, T.A.’s parents hired his sister to tutor him ten hours per week. Id. at 9.  An admini-
strative hearing officer later noted, without the aid of his mother and sister, T.A. would not have 
advanced through grades at Forest Grove High School. Id. 
5. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2488. 
6. Id. 
7. Id.  A school psychologist issued a report in September 2001 stating T.A. was not eligible 
for services under IDEA because he had no learning disability. Id. 
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of its intent to evaluate T.A. for special education services, and she con-
sented.8  The School District also provided T.A.’s parents with notice of 
procedural safeguards available to them under IDEA.9  The notice discussed 
situations in which parents who enroll their children in private school may 
be reimbursed for the cost of placement.10  According to the notice, where 
parents unilaterally enrolled a child in private school, the School District 
would reimburse the parents for those costs “only if . . . the child received 
special education and related services under the authority of a public agency 
before enrolling in the private school.”11 
Throughout the first half of 2001, several of the School District’s psy-
chologists and educational specialists evaluated T.A.12  On June 13, 2001, a 
team of school officials, including psychologists and educational special-
ists, determined T.A. did not have a learning disability and was therefore 
ineligible for special education.13  T.A.’s mother agreed with the psycholo-
gist’s decision that T.A. did not have a learning disability and was ineligible 
for special education services under the Act.14  Throughout the rest of 
T.A.’s time at FGHS, neither of his parents requested additional evaluations 
regarding whether T.A. was eligible for special education.15 
Over the next two years, T.A. continued to struggle academically.16  
Again concerned that T.A. had a learning disability, T.A.’s parents hired 
Dr. Fulop, a psychologist, in early 2003.17  Dr. Fulop evaluated T.A. on 
February 21 and 24, 2003.18  Following those sessions, Dr. Fulop diagnosed 
T.A. with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and a math 
disorder.19  On March 14, 2003, Dr. Fulop informed T.A.’s parents of his 
diagnosis and stated T.A. “had several learning problems and academic 
 
8. Brief of Petitioner at 8, Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (No. 08-305).  Under federal law, 
public agencies, most often school districts, must attempt to obtain parental consent before 
conducting an initial evaluation to determine whether a child is eligible for special-education 
services. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (2006). 
9. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 8.  For an overview of IDEA’s procedural safeguards, 
including the roles of the administrative law judge and the federal district court in IDEA cases, see 
M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., 437 F.3d 1085, 1096-98 (11th Cir. 
2006). 
10. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 8. 
11. Id.  The language in the notice closely resembled that of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) 
(2006). 
12. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d at 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1323 (D. Or. 2005). 
17. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1082. 
18. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 10. 
19. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1082.  Dr. Fulop also diagnosed T.A. with cannabis abuse and 
dysthmic disorder, a type of depression. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 11. 
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limitations, as well as [a] math disorder.”20  Dr. Fulop therefore recom-
mended a residential program for T.A.21  According to Dr. Fulop, the 
residential treatment facility at Mount Bachelor Academy, a residential 
private school, would provide an environment that could help T.A. with his 
learning difficulties, ADHD, and behavioral problems.22  On the basis of 
that recommendation, T.A.’s parents removed him from public school and, 
on March 24, 2003, enrolled him in Mount Bachelor Academy.23 
T.A.’s parents hired an attorney on March 28, 2003.24  On April 18, 
2003, seeking an order that would require FGHS to evaluate T.A. for “all 
areas of suspected disability,” T.A.’s parents requested a hearing pursuant 
to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).25  It was at this time FGHS first learned of T.A.’s 
placement at Mount Bachelor Academy.26  The Office of Administrative 
Hearings for the State of Oregon began the hearing in May 2003, but the 
hearing officer continued the hearing until September 2003 to allow the 
School District to further evaluate T.A.27  Medical and educational special-
ists from the School District evaluated T.A. during the summer of 2003 and 
determined he was not eligible for services under IDEA.28  On January 26, 
2004, the hearing officer issued an opinion, concluding T.A. was disabled 
and therefore eligible for special education under IDEA.29  The hearing 
 
20. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 11. 
21. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1082. 
22. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 11.  Mount Bachelor Academy was a private board-
ing school located in Prineville, Oregon; T.A. graduated from Mount Bachelor in June 2004. Id.  
After an investigation by the Oregon Department of Human Services that centered on allegations 
of mistreatment and humiliation of students, Mount Bachelor closed in late 2009. Barney Lerten, 
DHS, Mount Bachelor Academy Settle Case, KTVZ.COM, Oct. 2, 2010, http://www.ktvz.com/ 
news/25258065/detail.html; Maia Szalavitz, An Oregon School for Troubled Teens is Under 
Scrutiny, TIME, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1891082,00.html. 
23. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1082. 
24. Id. 
25. Id.  Under IDEA, parents and local educational agencies involved in a complaint “shall 
have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State 
educational agency or by the local educational agency, as determined by State law or by the State 
educational agency.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (2006). 
26. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 12.  T.A.’s father communicated with FGHS regard-
ing T.A.’s academic placement for some time before T.A. began attending Mount Bachelor Acad-
emy, but the Mount Bachelor placement was never discussed.  Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 
675 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066 (D. Or. 2009).  In January 2003, because of T.A.’s academic and 
behavioral difficulties, T.A.’s father arranged with FGHS for T.A. to finish high school through 
Portland Community College (PCC). Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 10.  After the February 
sessions with Dr. Fulop, T.A.’s father notified FGHS that T.A. would attend PCC after medical 
testing and a three-week “wilderness training program.” Id.  On March 10, 2003, T.A.’s father 
notified FGHS that T.A. was “officially disenrolled from FGHS and was registered at PCC.” Id. at 
11.  Then, on April 18, 2003, FGHS received notice of the request for a hearing under § 1415(f) 
and learned of the private school placement. Id. at 12. 
27. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1082. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
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officer further ruled the School District failed to offer T.A. a free appro-
priate public education as required by IDEA and was therefore responsible 
for the costs of T.A.’s placement at Mount Bachelor Academy.30 
The School District appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon pursuant to 
§ 1415(i).31  The district court concluded T.A. was statutorily ineligible for 
reimbursement under § 1412(a)(10)(C) because he had not previously re-
ceived special education services through the public school, and thus, the 
hearing officer erred as a matter of law in granting reimbursement.32  The 
district court also concluded the facts of the case did not warrant reimburse-
ment under general principles of equity.33  T.A. appealed the district court’s 
ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.34 
On appeal from the district court, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue 
of whether § 1412(a)(10)(C) “bars private school reimbursement for stu-
dents who have not ‘previously received special education and related ser-
vices,’ or whether those students remain eligible for private school reim-
bursement, as they were before [the 1997 Amendments to IDEA (1997 
Amendments)] under principles of equity pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C).”35  
The Ninth Circuit held a student who never received special education and 
related services from a school district is not barred as a matter of law from 
recovering the costs of private education.36  Finding the statutory require-
ments of § 1412(a)(10)(C) inapplicable to the case, the court held students 
who have not previously received special education through a public 
agency are eligible for reimbursement “to the same extent as before the 
1997 amendments, as ‘appropriate’ relief pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C).”37  
 
30. Id. at 1082-83. 
31. Id. at 1083.  The IDEA guarantees that: 
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (f) or (k) 
who does not have the right to an appeal under subsection (g), and any party aggrieved 
by the findings and decision made under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a 
civil action . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the 
United States, without regard to the amount in controversy. 
§ 1415(i)(2)(A). 
32. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1083.  The district court refused to reimburse T.A.’s parents 
for the cost of T.A.’s placement because “[t]he plainest reading of [§ 1412(a)(10)(C)] is that only 
children who had previously received special education services from the District are even eligible 
for such tuition reimbursement.” Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1332 (D. 
Or. 2005). 
33. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1083.  T.A. argued even if § 1412(a)(10)(C) did not authorize 
reimbursement in this case, the hearing officer could award reimbursement at her discretion under 
general principles of equity. Forest Grove, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1333. 
34. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1083. 
35. Id. at 1086. 
36. Id. at 1087-88. 
37. Id. at 1088. 
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The court therefore reversed the district court’s ruling that T.A. was not 
entitled to reimbursement as a matter of law.38 
The Ninth Circuit also held the district court abused its discretion in 
denying reimbursement because the district court made two distinct legal 
errors.39  First, the district court erred by considering inapplicable statutory 
requirements from § 1412(a)(10)(C) in its analysis of the equities.40  
Because neither T.A. nor the School District disputed that T.A. never 
received special education or related services through the School District, 
the district court incorrectly considered the statutory requirements of 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C).41  Second, the district court applied the wrong legal stan-
dard when it stated tuition reimbursement was available only in extreme 
cases.42  The Ninth Circuit noted nothing in § 1412(a)(10)(C), Supreme 
Court precedent, or Ninth Circuit precedent, suggested reimbursement was 
only available in extreme cases.43  The Ninth Circuit therefore reversed the 
district court’s denial of reimbursement and remanded the case to the 
district court.44 
The School District filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court.45  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to 
determine whether § 1412(a)(10)(C) established a categorical bar to tuition 
reimbursement for students who had not previously received special educa-
tion services under the authority of a public education agency.46  Noting the 
1997 Amendments did not alter the text of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), and refusing 
to read § 1412(a)(10)(C) to alter that provision’s meaning, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding IDEA authorizes reim-
bursement for private special education services regardless of whether the 
child previously received special education or related services through the 
public school.47  Because the district court found T.A. ineligible for tuition 
reimbursement as a matter of law, and did not properly consider the equities 
regarding whether reimbursement was warranted, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the district court.48 
 
38. Id. 
39. Id.  The Ninth Circuit applied an abuse of discretion standard because “IDEA makes 
clear that the district court exercises its discretion in fashioning appropriate relief.” Id. at 1084. 
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) (2006)). 
40. Id. at 1088. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 1089. 
45. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2490 (2009). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 2496. 
48. Id. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., the Supreme Court analyzed 
the 1997 Amendments to determine whether the amendments categorically 
barred reimbursement when a child had not previously received special 
education or related services through a public agency.49  Thus, to under-
stand the Court’s analysis, it is necessary to examine the 1997 Amend-
ments.50  To provide the appropriate context, it is useful to examine learn-
ing disabilities in general51 and how Congress and the United States 
Supreme Court have shaped the educational landscape for children with 
learning disabilities.52 
A. LEARNING DISABILITIES 
Congress has determined “[d]isability is a natural part of the human 
experience and in no way diminishes the right of individuals to participate 
in or contribute to society” and “[i]mproving educational results for chil-
dren with disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of 
ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and 
economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.”53  The term 
“learning disability” does not describe a distinct disability.54  Instead, the 
term is an invented category of special education composed of seven 
specific areas of disability, including receptive language, expressive 
language, basic reading skills, reading comprehension, written expression, 
mathematics calculation, and mathematical reasoning.55  Most children who 
have learning disabilities have more than one of the seven subtypes.56 
1. Learning Disabilities, Generally 
Learning disabilities can be persistent disorders that may not respond 
well to general or inappropriate instruction.57  Thus, appropriate instruction 
is key, and educational interventions are most likely to succeed if carried 
out by expert teachers.58  Early intervention is also vital because students 
 
49. Id. at 2490. 
50. See discussion infra Part II.D (explaining the reimbursement provisions of the 1997 
Amendments). 
51. See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (discussing learning disabilities, generally). 
52. See discussion infra Part II.B-C (outlining Supreme Court decisions as well as statutes 
commonly cited by courts in IDEA reimbursement cases). 
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2006). 
54. G. Reid Lyon, Learning Disabilities, 6 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 54, 55, 60 (1996). 
55. Id. at 60. 
56. Id. at 67. 
57. Id. at 71. 
58. Id. 
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with learning disabilities attain higher levels of educational achievement 
when they are identified early in their educational careers.59  Despite the 
need for early intervention, most children with learning disabilities are not 
identified until the third or fourth grade.60 
2. Public Special Education Before IDEA  
Throughout much of the history of public education in America, ser-
vices to disabled children were provided at the discretion of local school 
districts.61  School districts possessed tremendous discretion regarding the 
identification and education of children with special needs.62  According to 
the United States Department of Education, “in 1970, U.S. schools educated 
only one in five children with disabilities, and many states had laws exclud-
ing certain [disabled] students.”63  In 1975, congressional hearings revealed 
almost one million children with disabilities were receiving no education at 
all, and an additional 3.5 million were not receiving an education appro-
priate to their needs.64  In response to the need for identification and educa-
tion of children with learning disabilities, and in response to discrimination 
against children with special needs, Congress passed the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975.65 
 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. EDWIN W. MARTIN ET AL., The Legislative and Litigation History of Special Education, 
6 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 25, 26 (1996). 
62. Jordan L. Wilson, Missing the Big Idea:  The Supreme Court Loses Sight of the Policy 
Behind the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in Schaffer v. Weast, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 
161, 163 (2007). 
63. History:  Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities, U.S. 
OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUC. PROGRAMS, http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2011).  The United States Code provides: 
Before the date of enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975 (Public Law 94-142), the educational needs of millions of children with disabili-
ties were not being fully met because (A) the children did not receive appropriate 
educational services; (B) the children were excluded entirely from the public school 
system and from being educated with their peers; (C) undiagnosed disabilities pre-
vented the children from having a successful educational experience; or (D) a lack of 
adequate resources within the public school system forced families to find services 
outside the public school system. 
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006); see also Pa. Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of 
Pa., 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (1971) (per curiam) (enjoining Pennsylvania public school officials 
from applying state law denying education to children with learning disabilities). 
64. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 29. 
65. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482); Wilson, supra note 62, at 166-67. 
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B. THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
This section introduces the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act, now renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement 
Act.66  It also describes the responsibilities states assume by accepting 
IDEA funds, including the identification of disabled children and providing 
those children with free, appropriate public education.67 
1. Overview 
President Gerald Ford signed The Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act into law in 1975, and the Act took effect on October 1, 1977.68  
The title of the Act was changed by amendment in 1990 to the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act,69 and again by amendment in 2004 to the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act.70  Congress en-
acted IDEA to aid states in educating students with disabilities by providing 
federal funding of state efforts.71  At the heart of the IDEA is the principle 
that a disabled child should receive from public schools a free education, 
administered in the least restrictive environment, that is individualized to 
the child’s unique needs.72 
The United States Supreme Court has described IDEA as “a compre-
hensive scheme set up by Congress to aid the States in complying with their 
constitutional obligations to provide public education for [children with 
disabilities],”73 and “an ambitious federal effort to promote the education of 
handicapped children.”74  The Act did not create substantive educational 
standards, but rather elaborate procedural safeguards to facilitate parental 
involvement in school decisions.75  Nor does the Act protect every student 
with a disability, but only those students with a disability included in IDEA 
that adversely impacts the student’s education.76  In the case of a student 
 
66. See infra Part II.B.1. 
67. See infra Part II.B.2. 
68. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 30. 
69. Id. at 29. 
70. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 
2647 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482).  Despite the renaming of the Act 
in 2004, it is still acceptable to cite the Act as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 20 
U.S.C. § 1400(a). 
71. MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 72 (1998). 
72. Wilson, supra note 62, at 167. 
73. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984). 
74. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982). 
75. YELL, supra note 71, at 72. 
76. Id. at 73. 
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whose disability adversely affects his or her education, IDEA places upon 
states certain responsibilities to provide appropriate special education.77 
2. States’ Responsibilities Under IDEA 
Although states are not required to participate in IDEA,78 each of the 
fifty states currently receives IDEA funding.79  As a consequence of their 
participation, states have specific responsibilities under the Act, including 
the implementation of a “child-find” system to locate all disabled students 
from the ages of three to twenty-one residing within the state.80  In addition 
to locating children with disabilities, states and school districts are required 
to make available to all children with disabilities a free appropriate public 
education.81  To that end, states and school districts are required to make 
available to children identified as disabled under IDEA an individualized 
education program.82 
a. Free Appropriate Public Education 
The purpose of IDEA is “to assure that all handicapped children have 
available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes 
special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs 
[and] to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or 
guardians are protected.”83  Thus, IDEA requires states to provide to 
children with learning disabilities a “free appropriate public education” 
(FAPE).84  The Act defines a FAPE as: 
[S]pecial education and related services that (A) have been pro-
vided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, 
and without charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational 
agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, 
or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are 
 
77. See infra Part II.B.2. 
78. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 30. 
79. Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters:  The Supreme Court and the Clear Statement Rule 
for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1091-92 (2010). 
80. YELL, supra note 71, at 74; Seligmann, supra note 79, at 1092. 
81. Richard Apling & Nancy Lee Jones, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:  
Overview of Major Provisions, in THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 1-2 (Ian 
O. Javier ed., 2005); see discussion infra Part II.B.2.a (discussing states’ responsibilities to 
provide all students with disabilities a free appropriate public education). 
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2006). 
83. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 367 (1985) (citing 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(c)). 
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). 
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provided in conformity with the individualized education program 
required under section 1414(d) of [the Act].85 
The IDEA defines “special education” as “specifically designed in-
struction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a 
disability.”86  The Act defines “related services” as services that “may be 
required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special educa-
tion.”87  Under IDEA, related services include transportation and other 
supportive services such as physical, occupational, and speech therapy.88 
b. The Individualized Education Program 
To ensure each child identified as disabled under IDEA receives a 
FAPE, school districts must create for each disabled child within the district 
an “individualized education program.”89  The IDEA defines the term “indi-
vidualized education program” (IEP) as “a written statement for each child 
with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with 
section 1414(d) of [the Act].”90  States or school districts developing an IEP 
must include in the program, among other things, “a statement of the child’s 
present levels of academic achievement and functional performance, . . . a 
statement of measurable annual goals, . . . [and] a description of how the 
child’s progress towards meeting [those] annual goals will be meas-
ured[.]”91  IDEA mandates procedural requirements in the IEP formulation 
process to ensure parents and school officials develop an appropriate IEP.92 
If dissatisfied with a proposed IEP, parents may challenge its appropri-
ateness both administratively and judicially.93  Interpretation of a standard 
of appropriateness has been “difficult because of the diversity of the special 
education population.”94  Neither Congress nor the courts have provided a 
precise definition of an “appropriate education.”95  Rather, courts have set 
 
85. Id. 
86. Id. § 1401(29). 
87. Id. § 1401(26)(A). 
88. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 36. 
89. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005). 
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14). 
91. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). 
92. YELL, supra note 71, at 169. 
93. Parents may challenge the appropriateness of a proposed IEP administratively by re-
questing an impartial due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).  After exhausting all available 
administrative remedies, parents dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative proceedings 
“have the right to bring a civil action . . . in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a 
district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy.” Id. 
§ 1415(i)(2)(A). 
94. MARTIN ET AL., supra note 61, at 34. 
95. Id. 
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out “broad principles to be applied [in] individual circumstances.”96  The 
principles can generally be summarized as requiring an educational pro-
gram that “is (1) related to the child’s learning capacity, (2) specially 
designed for the child’s unique needs and not merely what is offered to 
others, and (3) reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit.”97 
C. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING THE IDEA AND 
REIMBURSEMENT FOR PRIVATE SPECIAL EDUCATION 
IDEA mandates a school district that cannot provide a disabled student 
a FAPE must provide and fund an appropriate private school placement.98  
The Supreme Court has considered several cases concerning reimbursement 
under IDEA for private special education services.99  Two cases decided 
prior to the 1997 Amendments have provided the basic legal framework for 
IDEA reimbursement cases:  School Committee of Burlington v. 
Department of Education100 and Florence County School District Four v. 
Carter.101 
1. Burlington 
In Burlington, the father of a public school student, dissatisfied with 
the school’s proposed IEP, unilaterally placed his child in a state-approved 
private school for special education.102  Following a lengthy administrative 
and judicial process, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two 
issues:  (1) whether reimbursement to parents for private school placement 
is appropriate relief under IDEA; and (2) whether the Act “bars such 
reimbursement to parents who reject a proposed IEP and place a child in a 
private school without the consent of local school authorities.”103  At the 
time of the decision in Burlington, IDEA made no explicit reference to 
reimbursement, but rather authorized a court to “grant such relief as the 
court determines is appropriate.”104  In determining what relief is 
 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Emily S. Rosenblum, Interpreting the 1997 Amendment to the IDEA:  Did Congress 
Intend to Limit the Remedy of Private School Tuition Reimbursement for Disabled Children?, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2734 (2009); see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Ed., 471 
U.S. 259, 370 (1985). 
99. See discussion infra Part II.C.1-2 (discussing cases often cited by courts in IDEA 
reimbursement cases). 
100. 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
101. 510 U.S. 7 (1993). 
102. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 362. 
103. Id. at 367. 
104. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2490 (2009) (quoting 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006)). 
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appropriate under the Act, consideration must be given to “the Act’s broad 
purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE, including through 
publicly funded private-school placements when necessary.”105  The Court 
held the grant of authority in § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) included “the power to 
order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on 
private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that 
such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.”106 
2. Carter 
In Carter, the parents of a public school student were dissatisfied with 
the public school’s proposed IEP.107  The parents unilaterally withdrew the 
student from public school and enrolled her in a private school.108  The 
parents then sued the school district, seeking reimbursement for costs 
incurred as a result of the private school placement.109  The district court 
found the private school did not comply with all IDEA requirements be-
cause it was not a state-approved private school for special education, but it 
provided the student with an appropriate education under IDEA.110  The 
district court held, although the private school did not meet every IDEA 
requirement, the student’s education at the private school was appropriate 
under IDEA and the parents were therefore entitled to reimbursement.111 
The school district appealed, arguing IDEA did not permit reimburse-
ment when parents unilaterally removed their child from public school and 
placed the child in a private school that did not meet every IDEA require-
ment.112  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the 
district court’s decision, holding placement in a private school not approved 
by the state is not a bar to reimbursement.113  Citing Burlington, the court 
concluded IDEA “imposes only two prerequisites to reimbursement:  that 
the program proposed by the state failed to provide the child a free appro-
priate public education, and that the private school in which the child is 
enrolled succeeded in providing an appropriate education[.]”114  The school 
 
105. Id. at 2491 (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369). 
106. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369. 
107. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 10 (1993). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 11. 
112. Carter v. Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four, 950 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1991). 
113. Id. at 158. 
114. Id. at 164. 
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district filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court.115 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Carter to determine whether a 
court may order reimbursement for parents who unilaterally enrolled their 
child in private school when the private school did not meet every IDEA 
requirement, but nonetheless provided an appropriate education under the 
Act.116  The Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, holding 
courts “may order reimbursement for parents who unilaterally withdraw 
their child from a public school that provides an inappropriate education 
under IDEA and put the child in a private school that provides an education 
that is otherwise proper under IDEA, but does not meet all the requirements 
of [the Act].”117  Thus, the Court reaffirmed the availability of reimburse-
ment for the costs of private special education, even where a child was 
placed in a private school that had not been approved by the State, so long 
as the school district failed to provide a FAPE and the placement was 
proper under the Act.118  The Court decided Carter in 1993, four years 
before Congress extensively amended IDEA.119 
D. THE 1997 AMENDMENTS TO IDEA 
In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA, adding several significant pro-
visions and restructuring the Act to make it easier to understand.120  
Congress’s purpose in passing the 1997 Amendments was to improve the 
performance and educational achievement of students with disabilities, as 
the goal of child identification had largely been met.121  Congress mandated 
several changes to the IEP requirements, including the implementation of 
measurable, annual educational goals.122  The 1997 Amendments also 
required states to conduct state- and district-wide assessments on the 
inclusion of students with disabilities.123  As part of the Act’s restructuring, 
§ 1415(e)(2), the provision of IDEA relied upon by the Burlington Court in 
granting reimbursement as appropriate relief, was renumbered 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).124  Despite the renumbering, Congress left the text of 
 
115. Carter, 510 U.S. at 12. 
116. Id. at 9. 
117. Id. at 9-10. 
118. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2009). 
119. See infra Part II.D. 
120. YELL, supra note 71, at 87. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2490 n.5 (2009). 
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the provision unaltered.125  Thus, the provision of the Act interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to authorize reimbursement as appropriate relief under 
IDEA was left unchanged.126 
The 1997 Amendments affected or created several IDEA provisions.127  
One new provision, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (clause (i)), makes clear IDEA does 
not require a school district to reimburse parents of a child with disabilities 
for the cost of the child’s private special education “if [the district] made a 
free appropriate public education available to the child and the parents 
elected to place the child in [the] private school or facility.”128  Under 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (clause (ii)), a court or hearing officer may require 
such reimbursement “if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency 
had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child” and 
the child has “previously received special education and related services 
under the authority of a public agency.”129  Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) 
(clause (iii)) addresses the circumstances in which a reimbursement under 
clause (ii) “may be reduced or denied,” such as when parents fail to provide 
the district notice of the private school placement.130 
E. CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING THE IDEA 
REIMBURSEMENT PROVISIONS 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Forest Grove, federal appel-
late courts that considered the issue of whether the 1997 Amendments cate-
gorically barred reimbursement when a child had not previously received 
 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 2491-92. 
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (2006).  Clause (i) reads: 
Subject to subparagraph (A), this subchapter does not require a local educational agen-
cy to pay for the cost of education, including special education and related services, of 
a child with a disability at a private school or facility if that agency made a free appro-
priate public education available to the child and the parents elected to place the child 
in such private school or facility. 
Id. 
129. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).  Clause (ii), entitled “Reimbursement for private school 
placement,” reads: 
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education 
and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private 
elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the public 
agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents 
for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had 
not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner 
prior to that enrollment. 
Id. 
130. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).  A parent’s failure to give adequate notice may be excused in 
certain circumstances.  See id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv). 
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special education or related services reached inconsistent results.131  The 
First Circuit held reimbursement was barred in such circumstances,132 while 
the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits reached the opposite result.133  
This section examines the string of IDEA reimbursement cases leading to 
the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari to resolve the issue in Forest Grove. 
1. Greenland School District v. Amy N. 
In Greenland School District v. Amy N.,134 the parents of a public 
school student unilaterally placed the student in private school after her 
fourth-grade year, never having discussed with the public school the possi-
bility of the public school providing special education.135  The parents 
sought tuition reimbursement for the girl’s entire fifth-grade year and part 
of her sixth-grade year.136  The district court reversed the hearing officer’s 
award of reimbursement, holding the parents were not entitled to reimburse-
ment.137  Quoting Burlington for the proposition that “parents who unilat-
erally change their child’s placement . . . without the consent of state or 
local school officials do so at their own financial risk,” the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed.138 
2. M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. School Board of 
Miami-Dade County, Florida 
In M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. School Board of Miami-Dade County, 
Florida,139 the parents of a child with profound hearing loss enrolled the 
child in a private preschool.140  The child was never enrolled in public 
school and, therefore, never received special education services through a 
public agency.141  The district court dismissed the parents’ complaint and 
the parents appealed.142  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
 
131. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2490. 
132. Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 159-60 (1st Cir. 2004).  The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals hinted in dicta and in an unpublished opinion that it might have followed 
the First Circuit’s logic. See Rosenblum, supra note 98, at 2767-68. 
133. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2008); Frank G. v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park, 459 F.3d 356, 376 (2d Cir. 2006); M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd. of 
Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., 437 F.3d 1085, 1099 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
134. 358 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2004). 
135. Greenland, 358 F.3d at 152. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 162 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 373-74 
(1985)). 
139. 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006). 
140. M.M., 437 F.3d at 1098. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 1102. 
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“parents are not required in all cases to first enroll their child in public 
school pursuant to an inadequate IEP in order to preserve their right to 
reimbursement.”143  Although the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless agreed with 
the district court that the parents’ complaint should have been dismissed, 
albeit for different reasons, the court’s ruling made clear that parents could 
be reimbursed, at least in theory, for special education services received as 
the result of a unilateral placement. 
3. Frank G. v. Board of Education of Hyde Park 
Six months after the Eleventh Circuit decided M.M., the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals issued its decision in Frank G. v. Board of Education of 
Hyde Park.144  The Second Circuit held the IDEA reimbursement provi-
sions did not require the receipt of special education services by a state 
agency as a prerequisite to tuition reimbursement.145  In so holding, the 
Second Circuit declined to read § 1412(a)(10)(C) as requiring a child to 
have previously received special education or related services prior to 
becoming eligible for tuition reimbursement.146  Although at first blush the 
Frank G. decision seemed to be at odds with the First Circuit’s conclusion 
in Greenland, the Second Circuit noted it too would have denied the 
reimbursement sought by the parents in Greenland, but not on the grounds 
that the child never received special education services.147  Rather, the 
Second Circuit stressed parents must provide notice to the public school of 
their child’s need for special education services, which the parents in 
Greenland failed to do.148  Thus, the Second Circuit concluded it would 
have denied reimbursement in Greenland because the parents’ failure to 
provide notice of the child’s need would have precluded the parents from 
being equitably entitled to tuition reimbursement.149 
 
143. Id. at 1099 (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-70). 
144. 459 F.3d 356 (2006).  United States Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, then a 
Second Circuit Judge, sat on the panel that decided Frank G., 459 F.3d at 359.  In 2009, Justice 
Sotomayor left the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to fill the seat vacated by retiring Justice 
David Souter.  Interestingly, Justice Souter authored the dissenting opinion in Forest Grove. 
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
145. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 376. 
146. Id. at 359. 
147. Id. at 376. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
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4. Board of Education of City School District of 
New York v. Tom F. 
On August 9, 2006, in light of its decision in Frank G., the Second 
Circuit vacated a district court’s reversal of an award of tuition reimburse-
ment in which the district court “reach[ed] the same conclusion as to the 
meaning of § 1412(a)(10)(C) that the First Circuit reached in [Greenland 
School Dist. v.] Amy N.”150  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Board 
of Education of City School District of New York v. Tom F.151 to resolve the 
lingering IDEA reimbursement question.152  In Tom F., after Justice 
Kennedy recused himself, the Court split 4-4, affirming without opinion the 
judgment of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and leaving the circuits 
split on the issue.153 
5. Forest Grove School District v. T.A. 
In Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district 
court ruling that found T.A.’s parents ineligible for tuition reimbursement 
under § 1412(a)(10)(C) because T.A. never received special education or 
related services in public school.154  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Forest Grove in order to once again address the question of whether 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C) authorized the award of tuition reimbursement only in the 
case where a child had previously received special education or related 
services.155 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., Justice Stevens wrote the 
majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito.156  The majority held the 1997 Amendments to 
IDEA did not create a categorical bar to reimbursement when a child had 
not previously received special education or related services under the 
authority of a public agency.157  Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion, 
in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.158 
 
150. Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y.C. v. Tom F., No. 01 Civ. 6845(GBD), 2005 WL 
22866, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2005). 
151. 552 U.S. 1 (2007). 
152. Tom F., 552 U.S. at 2. 
153. Id.  
154. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2489 (2009). 
155. Id. at 2490. 
156. Id. at 2487. 
157. Id. at 2488. 
158. Id. at 2487. 
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A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The majority first identified the analysis in Burlington as the 
appropriate analytical framework for the dispute in Forest Grove.159  Next, 
the majority concluded the 1997 Amendments to IDEA did not require a 
reading of the Act’s reimbursement provision that is inconsistent with the 
Court’s decision in Burlington.160  Finally, the Court concluded a rule deny-
ing reimbursement when a child had not previously received special educa-
tion through the public school would not comport with the IDEA’s remedial 
purpose, and would produce an irrational rule.161  The Court remanded the 
case to the district court with instructions for the district court to consider 
the equities of the case on remand.162 
1. Burlington is the Appropriate Legal Background 
The majority began by noting the unanimous opinion in Burlington 
provided the appropriate legal background for the Court’s analysis in Forest 
Grove.163  The majority then distinguished the dispute in Forest Grove from 
the disputes in Burlington and Carter because Forest Grove did not concern 
the adequacy of a proposed IEP, but rather the School District’s failure to 
provide an IEP at all.164  Also, unlike the children in Burlington and Carter, 
T.A. had not previously received special education or related services 
through the public schools.165  The Court dismissed the factual differences 
as irrelevant because the Court’s decisions in Burlington and Carter “de-
pended on the language and purpose of the Act and not the particular facts 
involved.”166  The majority then noted a school district’s failure to propose 
an IEP is as serious a violation under IDEA as failing to propose an ade-
quate IEP.167  Thus, the Court noted a reimbursement could be authorized in 
such an instance unless the 1997 Amendments required a different result.168  
The Court then considered whether the 1997 Amendments established a 
categorical bar to tuition reimbursement when a student had not received 
special education or related services in public school.169 
 
159. See discussion infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the majority’s analysis of whether 
Burlington applies to the question presented in Forest Grove). 
160. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2496. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 2490. 
164. Id. at 2491. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
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2. The 1997 Amendments Do Not Support the School District’s 
Reading of the IDEA’s Reimbursement Provisions 
The majority reiterated the Burlington Court’s statement that 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the IDEA was “to ensure that all children 
with disabilities are provided ‘a free appropriate public education which 
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their 
unique needs [and] to assure that the rights of [such] children and their 
parents or guardians are protected.’”170  The 1997 Amendments furthered 
that goal by preserving the Act’s purpose of providing a FAPE to all 
children with disabilities.171  Congress did not alter the text of 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which the Court construed in Burlington to allow 
courts to provide reimbursement for the cost of private special education 
when a school district failed to provide a FAPE, when it amended IDEA in 
1997.172  The majority cited Lorillard v. Pons173 for the proposition that 
“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial 
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a 
statute without change.”174  The Court found no clear expression in the 
1997 Amendments, or elsewhere, of Congress’s intent to abrogate the 
Court’s decisions in Burlington or Carter or to repeal some portion of 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).175  Thus, the Court declared it would continue to 
construe that provision as providing reimbursement for private school 
placement as “appropriate” relief when a school district failed to provide a 
FAPE.176 
The majority then addressed the School District’s argument that the 
1997 Amendments effectively repealed at least a portion of 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).177  The School District relied primarily on clauses (i) 
and (ii) for the proposition that “Congress intended § 1412(a)(10)(C) to 
provide the exclusive source of authority for courts to order reimbursement 
when parents unilaterally enroll a child in private school.”178  The School 
District argued because § 1412(a)(10)(C) only discusses reimbursement for 
children who have previously received special education through the public 
school, reimbursement under IDEA is only appropriate in those 
 
170. Id. (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 367 (1985)). 
171. Id. at 2491-92. 
172. Id. at 2492. 
173. 434 U.S. 575 (1978). 
174. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2492 (quoting Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
          
608 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:587 
circumstances.179  The majority rejected this argument.180  Notably, the 
School District offered no evidence that Congress intended to supersede the 
Court’s decisions in Burlington and Carter.181  Also, the majority noted the 
1997 Amendments did not explicitly preclude reimbursement in this cir-
cumstance.182  Under clause (i), reimbursement is explicitly barred only 
when a school district provides a FAPE and an adequate IEP.183  Because 
clause (i) makes clear reimbursement is not authorized when a school 
district provides a FAPE, the majority stated that the clause may be read to 
indicate reimbursement is appropriate when a school district failed that 
task.184 
The majority then explained clause (ii) also failed to support the School 
District’s position.185  Clause (ii) states that courts “may require” reim-
bursement in certain circumstances, but does not bar reimbursement in 
other scenarios.186  The majority read clause (ii) together with clauses (iii) 
and (iv) as “elaborating on the general rule that courts may order reimburse-
ment when a school district fails to provide a FAPE by listing factors that 
may affect a reimbursement award.”187  The factors are relevant in the com-
mon scenario in which a school district provides some special education but 
the parents view the services as inadequate.188  Thus, the majority 
interpreted the clauses of § 1412(a)(10)(C) as “elucidative rather than 
exhaustive.”189 
Finally, the majority stated its interpretation of § 1412(a)(10)(C) 
prevented the abrogation sub silentio by Congress of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Burlington and Carter.190  The majority cited Branch v. 
Smith191 for its conclusion that “[i]t would take more than Congress’ failure 
to comment on the category of cases in which a child has not previously 
received special-education services for [the Court] to conclude that the 
Amendments substantially superseded [the Court’s] decisions and in large 
 
179. Id.  The dissent adopted this interpretation. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 2493. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. (citing United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 (2007)). 
190. Id. at 2493-94. 
191. 538 U.S. 254 (2003). 
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part repealed § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).”192  Thus, the majority explained it would 
continue to read § 1412(a)(10)(C) in a manner consistent with its decisions 
in Burlington and Carter.193 
The majority rejected the School District’s reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C) 
because it found the argument at odds with the remedial purpose behind 
IDEA, and particularly IDEA’s reimbursement provisions.194  Pointing to 
the language of the Act, the majority reiterated the purpose of IDEA is to 
“ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a [FAPE] 
that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet 
their unique needs.”195  A rule denying reimbursement when a child had not 
previously received special-education services would leave the rights of 
children with disabilities “less than complete.”196  The majority concluded 
the School District’s reading also conflicted with the Act’s “child-find” 
requirement because it would reward states for refusing to identify children 
as in need of special-education services.197 
3. Avoiding an Irrational Rule 
The majority refused to adopt the School District’s reading of 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C) because it would produce a rule that “immuniz[es] a 
school district’s refusal to find a child eligible for special-education 
services no matter how compelling the child’s need.”198  The resulting rule 
would “border[] on the irrational” because the Act would then provide a 
remedy when a school district provides inadequate special education 
services, while failing to provide a remedy in the “more egregious situation 
in which the school district unreasonably denies a child access to such 
services altogether.”199  The majority noted the procedural safeguards 
afforded to parents under the IDEA would not alleviate that “strange” result 
because the review of a school’s failure to provide a FAPE is often delayed 
and fails to proceed with the “speed necessary to avoid detriment to the 
child’s education.”200 
 
192. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2494; see Branch, 538 U.S. at 273 (noting absent clearly 
expressed congressional intent, repeals by implication are disfavored). 
193. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2494. 
194. Id. at 2494-95. 
195. Id. at 2494 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006)). 
196. Id. at 2495 (citing Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 
(1985)). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. (citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370). 
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4. The Spending Clause 
The School District argued because IDEA is a Spending Clause 
statute,201 “and the Spending Clause requires Congress to give clear notice 
of any obligation it imposes on the States as a condition of receiving federal 
funds,”202 the absence of statutory text regarding reimbursement for uni-
lateral placements prohibits reimbursement in such a circumstance.203  In 
support of its argument, the School District noted the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. 
Murphy204 that IDEA does not authorize courts to award expert services 
fees to parents because IDEA does not provide states notice of the pos-
sibility of such awards.205  In rejecting the School District’s Spending 
Clause argument, the Court distinguished Forest Grove from Arlington.206  
According to the Court, Forest Grove differed from Arlington because, as a 
condition of accepting IDEA funding, “States expressly agree to provide a 
FAPE to all children with disabilities.”207  By failing to provide a FAPE and 
later reimbursing parents for the costs of private education, a school district 
simply “belatedly pay[s] expenses that it should have paid all along.”208  
The Court also stated Burlington provided notice to states that courts may 
authorize reimbursement for the costs of private special education in 
“appropriate circumstances.”209  Thus, despite the complete absence of 
language in the Act regarding reimbursement for unilateral placements, the 
Court imputed notice to the states. 
5. Financial Burden on Schools 
The School District argued reading IDEA to authorize reimbursement 
for unilateral private school placements would impose upon public school 
districts a substantial financial burden.210  The majority disagreed, citing 
Carter for the well established safeguard that the Act authorizes reimburse-
ment “only [when] a federal court concludes both that the public placement 
violated IDEA and the private school placement was proper under the 
 
201. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 2006 (2007). 
202. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 14. 
203. Id. at 19. 
204. 548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
205. Arlington, 548 U.S. at 304; see Brief of Petitioner, supra note 8, at 17-18. 
206. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2009). 
207. Id. 
208. Id. (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370-71 (1985)). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 2496. 
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Act.”211  Even when a court orders reimbursement, the majority noted the 
award may be reduced “if the equities so warrant.”212  The equities to be 
considered by the court contemplating reimbursement are presumed to 
favor the school district.213  Also, parents who unilaterally enroll their child 
in private school do so at their own risk.214  Because of the requirements for 
reimbursement, the majority noted “the incidence of private-school 
placement at public expense is quite small.”215  Thus, the majority’s holding 
did not place upon public school districts a substantial financial burden.216 
6. Summary of Majority Opinion 
The majority concluded the 1997 Amendments did not modify the text 
of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) nor alter the provision’s meaning.217  Thus, the ma-
jority held IDEA “authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private special-
education services when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and the 
private-school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child 
previously received special education or related services through the public 
school.”218  The majority therefore affirmed the judgment of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.219  The Court remanded the case to the district 
court for that court to consider the equities and decide whether T.A.’s 
parents were entitled to tuition reimbursement.220 
 
211. Id. (citing Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
212. Id.  The majority provided an example of one such circumstance:  when parents fail to 
provide the school district with adequate notice of their intent to enroll the child in private school. 
Id. 
213. Id. (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62-63 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
214. Id. (citing Carter, 510 U.S. at 15). 
215. Id. (citing Brief for Nat’l Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 13-14, Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (No. 08-305)). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
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B. JUSTICE SOUTER’S DISSENTING OPINION 
Justice Souter’s dissent first rejected the majority’s reading of 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as “overstretching.”221  Next, the dissent concluded, 
despite the majority’s assertion to the contrary, Burlington and Carter 
would be decided the same under its reading of the Act’s reimbursement 
provisions because the dissent’s reading was consistent with those 
decisions.222  Finally, the dissent rejected the majority’s claim that reading 
clause (ii) as restrictive effectively gave school districts a veto on 
reimbursement awards.223 
1. Limitless Reimbursement 
The dissent categorized the majority’s holding as placing no limit on 
reimbursement for private tuition, despite what the dissent labeled a “clear 
limitation imposed by § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).”224  Noting the Burlington 
Court emphasized the lack of an IDEA provision addressing reimbursement 
when it labeled reimbursement as appropriate relief under the Act, the dis-
sent inferred Congress acted explicitly on the issue of reimbursement via 
the 1997 Amendments, which added to the IDEA several provisions 
“explicitly addressing the issue of ‘[p]ayment for education of children 
enrolled in private schools without consent of or referral by the public agen-
cy.’”225  Justice Souter concluded the language in the 1997 Amendments 
“generally prohibit[s] reimbursement if the school district made a [FAPE] 
available, and if they are to have any effect, there is no exception except by 
agreement or for a student who previously received special education 
services that were inadequate.”226  Conceding IDEA’s silence on the case of 
a child with no previous special education services and no FAPE, the 
dissent rejected the majority’s conclusion that clause (ii) is merely “one of a 
variety of circumstances in which such reimbursement is permitted.”227  
Justice Souter cited Corley v. United States,228 in which the Court stated 
 
221. See discussion infra Part III.B.1 (explaining the dissent’s concern that the majority’s 
rule places no limit on private tuition reimbursement). 
222. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (concluding Burlington and Carter would be decided 
the same under the dissent’s reading of IDEA’s reimbursement provisions). 
223. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the dissent’s argument that IDEA’s 
procedural safeguards protect parents against uncooperative school districts). 
224. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2497-98 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
225. Id. at 2498 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006)). 
226. Id. at 2497 (internal citations omitted) (citing §§ 1412(a)(10)(B); 1412(a)(10)(C)(i)-(ii)). 
227. Id. at 2499. 
228. 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009). 
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“[o]ne of the most basic interpretive cannons is that a statute should be 
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions,” for the proposition 
that the majority’s conclusion was incorrect because it rendered clauses (ii) 
and (iii) unnecessary.229  The dissent noted the majority’s interpretation 
meant that, in both clauses (i) and (ii), “Congress meant to add nothing to 
the statutory scheme.”230  To avoid such a result, the dissent would have 
read clause (ii) to allow reimbursement only in the instance when a child 
has previously received special education or related services in public 
school.231 
2. Reading § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to Preclude Reimbursement in 
this Circumstance Would Not Alter the Outcome of 
Burlington or Carter 
The dissent noted, in Burlington and Carter, both sets of parents were 
parents of a child with a disability who previously received special educa-
tion or related services under the authority of a public agency.232  In each of 
those cases, the only question was whether parents who cooperated with the 
school district in formulating an IEP, when all agreed the child was dis-
abled, could be reimbursed for the subsequent placement of the child in 
private school.233  Both cases held reimbursement was appropriate “if the 
court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed 
IEP, is proper under the Act.”234  Because the dissent would have read 
clause (ii) as prohibiting reimbursement when a child has not previously 
received special education services under the authority of a public agency, 
the dissent’s interpretation of IDEA’s reimbursement provisions was con-
sistent with those decisions.235 
3. No Conflict with the Remedial Purpose Behind IDEA 
Justice Souter disputed the majority’s conclusion that reading 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C) to prohibit reimbursement in the case of a child who has 
not previously received special education services through the public school 
was at odds with the general remedial purpose of the Act.236  The majority 
 
229. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2499 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 
1560). 
230. Id. at 2500. 
231. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)). 
232. Id. at 2502. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 2501 (citing Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12 (1993)). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 2502. 
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concluded the dissent’s reading would place control of reimbursement 
awards solely in the hands of school districts because, by refusing to iden-
tify a child as in need of special education services, school districts would 
be essentially immunized from having to pay for the child’s private special 
education.237  The dissent countered by citing IDEA’s elaborate procedural 
safeguards, which protect a child’s substantive rights under the Act, for the 
proposition that the “administrative and judicial review [process] is the 
answer to the Court’s claim that reading [clause (ii)] as restrictive, not 
illustrative, immunizes a school district’s intransigence, giving it an effec-
tive veto on reimbursement for private placement.”238 
IV. IMPACT 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Forest Grove has been characterized 
as “an illusory win for parents” of children with disabilities.239  In reality, 
however, the Court’s ruling at least represents a small triumph for such 
parents when the result is measured against the other possible outcome.240  
Importantly, Forest Grove, at the very least, prohibits § 1412(a)(10)(C) 
from playing a gate-keeping role in IDEA reimbursement cases.  That is, 
after Forest Grove, courts can no longer dismiss claims for tuition reim-
bursement simply because the child whose education is at issue never re-
ceived special education or related services in public school.  Instead, courts 
must analyze the equities of individual cases to determine whether reim-
bursement is proper in each circumstance.  It may be true that many parents 
are denied reimbursement after courts have weighed the equities of 
particular cases, but such a result will rightly be based on an analysis of 
several important factors, including parental cooperation with school 
officials, and not simply on whether a child was fortuitous enough to have 
previously received special education in public school. 
 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 2503. 
239. See Natalie Pyong Kocher, Lost in Forest Grove:  Interpreting IDEA’s Inherent 
Paradox, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 333, 348 (2010).  One commentator stated: 
Forest Grove is viewed as a victory for parents of children with disabilities who may 
now seek reimbursement for private school tuition, even if their child never attended a 
public school.  The decision, however, provides no actual assurance to parents in this 
atypical situation and only removes the absolute bar to tuition reimbursement, indi-
cating that the actual implications of the decision may be less significant than they 
appear.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
240. Had the Supreme Court ruled the 1997 Amendments to IDEA indeed imposed a 
categorical bar to reimbursement in a case such as T.A.’s, parents of children like him would be 
left without a remedy.  Avoiding such a result is at least a small victory for parents of disabled 
children.  
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Having established the Supreme Court’s decision in Forest Grove is of 
some value to parents of children with disabilities, this part examines the 
extent of the case’s impact.  Section A examines the impact on Forest 
Grove upon the special education litigation landscape.  Next, section B 
describes how Forest Grove reinforces the role of equitable principles in the 
outcomes of IDEA reimbursement cases. 
A. AN END TO COSTLY LITIGATION 
The case represents the end to a split in the circuit courts of appeals 
that led to costly, drawn-out litigation.  The Forest Grove School District 
reportedly spent at least $244,000 over a period of six years litigating 
Forest Grove.241  Now that the Supreme Court has clarified the meaning of 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C), school districts and parents will no longer find them-
selves in court arguing for or against a categorical bar to tuition reimburse-
ment in cases like Forest Grove, Greenland, M.M., Frank G., and Tom F.  
Of course, litigation remains a possibility when a district allegedly fails to 
offer a FAPE and the parents determine private school placement is appro-
priate under IDEA, but Congress envisioned such litigation as necessary 
when it drafted the Act.242  The Forest Grove decision does nothing to 
discourage that type of litigation, nor should it, but it does allow both 
parties to enter into litigation knowing, at the very least, whether reimburse-
ment in the case of a child who never received special education in a public 
school is statutorily permissible. 
B. THE EMPHASIS ON THE EQUITIES 
In Forest Grove, the equities seemed to mitigate both for and against 
an award of reimbursement.  On the one hand, the School District’s initial 
evaluation of T.A., which occurred two years before T.A.’s placement at 
Mount Bachelor, proved to be substantially inaccurate.243  If the School 
District would have identified T.A. as learning disabled and eligible for 
special education in mid-2001, rather than forcing T.A.’s parents to hire an 
independent specialist after two additional years of academic struggle, 
perhaps the District would have had a better argument against reimburse-
ment.  On the other hand, although T.A.’s parents were mostly cooperative 
 
241. Nancy Townsley, U.S. Supreme Court Interprets Law to Say that Parents of Special 
Needs Students Can Seek Tuition Reimbursement for Private Schooling, FOREST GROVE NEWS-
TIMES, June 23, 2009, http://www.forestgrovenewstimes.com/news/story.php?story_id= 
124582710640480800. 
242. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing to the parties involved in such a circumstance 
the right to bring a civil action in state or federal court, regardless of the amount in controversy). 
243. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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with School District officials, they became less cooperative as the entire 
process unfolded.  For example, as mentioned above, T.A.’s parents pro-
vided the School District notice of T.A.’s placement at Mount Bachelor 
only after enrolling him at the private school.244 
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the United States 
District Court for the District of Oregon weighed the equitable arguments 
both for and against reimbursement.245  In its analysis, the court included a 
discussion of each of the above factors and found the lack of notice pro-
vided by T.A.’s parents favored the School District, but the District’s 
mishandling of the 2001 evaluation favored T.A.246  In holding reimburse-
ment was not warranted in T.A.’s case, the district court identified the 
“decisive factor” as the fact that T.A.’s  parents apparently enrolled him in 
Mount Bachelor not because of his learning disabilities, but because of his 
drug abuse and behavioral problems.247  The court found compelling the 
application to Mount Bachelor academy, which T.A.’s father completed on 
T.A.’s behalf.248  On it, T.A.’s father listed the “enrollment was precipitated 
by ‘inappropriate behavior, depression, opposition, drug use, runaway.’”249  
Thus, the district court concluded “[t]he equities [did] not favor requiring 
the District to reimburse T.A.’s parents for a decision to send T.A. to a 
school because of his drug abuse and behavioral problems that [were] 
unrelated to his difficulties focusing in school.”250 
The district court’s decision not to award reimbursement on remand 
brings to light the true impact of Forest Grove:  although no categorical bar 
to reimbursement exists in the case of a student who has not previously 
received special education in public school, courts will continue to decide 
individual cases on the equities.  In essence, although Forest Grove clari-
fied a hotly contested point of law, the practical implications of the case are 
somewhat limited because the case only clarified who is eligible for 
reimbursement.251  The framework courts must follow in deciding IDEA 
reimbursement cases remains unchanged. 
 
244. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
245. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1066-68 (D. Or. 2009). 
246. Id. at 1066-67. 
247. Id. at 1067. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. (quoting A.L.J.’s Final Order Findings of Fact ¶ 89). 
250. Id. at 1068. 
251. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2488 (2009) (clarifying that the 
1997 Amendments to IDEA do not bar tuition reimbursement in the case of a child who has not 
previously received special education under the authority of a public agency). 
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In his dissent in Forest Grove, Justice Souter wrote that the majority’s 
decision placed no limit on reimbursement in IDEA cases.252  Federal cir-
cuit court opinions handed down since Forest Grove both prove and dis-
prove his point.  In Ashland School District v. Parents of Student R.J.,253 the 
Ninth Circuit denied reimbursement to the parents of a student eligible for 
services under IDEA because his private school placement was not 
“appropriate” under the Act.254  In Richardson Independent School District 
v. Michael Z.,255 however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held a district 
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding tuition reimbursement despite 
the parents’ failure to notify the school district of the child’s withdrawal 
from public school.256  Thus, it is clear courts continue to decide IDEA 
reimbursement cases on the equities of individual circumstances.257  The 
entirety of the litigation that was Forest Grove serves to reinforce the vital 
role of the equities in IDEA “appropriate relief,” a role that has been clearly 
articulated by the Supreme Court since Burlington.258 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., the United States Supreme 
Court held § 1412(a)(10)(C) did not categorically bar reimbursement for 
private school tuition when a child had not previously received special 
education or related services through a public school.259  In clarifying the 
meaning of § 1412(a)(10)(C), the Supreme Court resolved a split among the 
circuit courts and reinforced the validity of the well-established, equity-
based framework used by courts in IDEA reimbursement cases.260  
Although Forest Grove notably makes reimbursement an available remedy 
to the parents of children who have not previously received special 
 
252. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2497-98 (2009) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
253. 588 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2009). 
254. Ashland, 588 F.3d at 1010-11.  Essentially, the Ninth Circuit reached the same 
conclusion in Ashland that the United States District Court for the District of Oregon reached on 
remand in Forest Grove. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1068 (D. Or. 
2009). 
255. 580 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2009). 
256. Richardson, 580 F.3d at 301. 
257. See, e.g., Forest Grove, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 (holding that, although tuition reim-
bursement was available to parents of a child who had not previously received special education 
through a public agency, reimbursement was not warranted because “[t]he equities [did] not 
favor” such a result). 
258. C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 71 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he principles 
stated [in Forest Grove] with regard to equitable relief under the IDEA are not new.”) (citing Sch. 
Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985)). 
259. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2496. 
260. Id. 
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education in public school, the case’s impact on IDEA reimbursement cases 
is, and will most likely remain, somewhat limited, due in most part to the 
Act’s and the Supreme Court’s requirement that courts decide such cases 
under equitable principles.261  The clarification of the meaning of IDEA’s 
reimbursement provisions is significant, however, because it puts to rest a 
costly period in the history of special education law.262 
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